Bryan G.· Norton, “Environmental Ethics and Weak. Anth ropocentrism,” Environmental Ethics,. Vol. 6, No.2 (Summer ), pp. Anthropocentrism is. In Bryan G. Norton’s article entitled, “Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism,” Norton explains his perspective of how an adequate environmental. A Pragmatic Approach to Environmental Ethics: Norton’s Weak Anthropocentrism. Blog Environmentalists have struggled with a pragmatic.
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Norton tries to environmemtal a more defensible worldview of weak anthropocentrism, which is anthropocentirsm appealing to environmentalists because it is not as radical, not difficult to justify claims of the intrinsic value of nonhuman objects, and it provides a framework for stating obligations that do beyond just human concerns, or felt preferences.
Find it on Scholar. He argues that the general rejection of an thropocentrism so prevalent in environmental ethics is not required, and. Definitions Anthropocentrism —humans are the only loci of intrinsic value.
Thus, strong anthropocentrism places value on the satisfaction of individual felt preferences, while weak anthropocentrism fulfills some felt preferences but emphasizes considered preferences as the central determinate factor of values. The trend is, he notes, to posit intrinsic value in nonhuman nature and derive an environmental ethic from that positing.
Karim Jebari – – Philosophy and Technology 29 3: This would fit in with the position of Aristotle concerning the percep tions of the good man. And it ap pears also that Norton holds that any environmentally unsound practice is ipso facto irrational and counter to any ideal and thus would not be adopted. If this meaning is ac cepted, then it is possible for the weak anthropocentrist to attribute intrinsic value to nature as well as instrumental value.
First, he explains the difference between felt preferences and concerned preferences.
In some cases, hunters use this practice to protect the interests of humans, however in most cases, the wolves are killed for sport. But until such a reduction is shown to oc cur, however, the weak anthropocentric position can provide a frame work for an adequate environmental ethic, an ethic that environmentsl extend moral consideration to nonhuman individuals. Presumably in terms of the earth there will be more than one person managing such a large planet.
Strong anthropocentrism is more exploitative like discussed with the previously discussed author, Baxter. Nroton Should We Care?
Bryan G. Norton, Environmental ethics and weak anthropocentrism – PhilPapers
Laura Westra – – In Ben A. To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: He notes that in the stan dard anthropocentric position every instance of value originates in a contribution to hu man values and that all elements in nature can, at most, have value instrumental to the satisfaction of human inter ests. It would appear that Norton shares a common axiology with traditional Western philosophy, that values exist in the subjective experience of valuers. One ought not to harm other humans unjustifiably.
Norton is aware of the need to reject this reduct ion. Other entities are judged to be of some kind of extrinsic value insofar as they are instrumental in or con tribute toward the achieving of that human state or experience held to be of intrinsic value.
This has two principles: Noel Castree – – Ethics, Place and Environment 6 1: Another version of anthropocentrism is the one described earlier by Norton as “weak anthropocentrism,” in which val ues are determined by the perceptions or judgments of humans but can be independent of human interests.
The history of environmental ethics reflects this ex pansion as features such as the experience of pleasure or happiness, sentience, and the act of flourishing were judged to be of intrinsic val ue. By such valuing of certain hu man experiences or states this ethic would allow for the censure or praise of actions done by humans toward the environment, in light of whether the actions hindered or aided in the realization of these ex periences.
Michel Dion – – Environmental Ethics 20 2: You are commenting using your Facebook account. Norton also discusses strong anthropocentrism, which is similar to our previously discussed notion of anthropocentrism.
But one can harm something only if it is a good in its own right in the nortoon of being a locus of fundamental value[G].
Wenz – – Environmental Ethics 24 4: The anthropocentrists are open to attack, Norton holds, because they claim that the loci of value are located in human interests. But this establishes only that theories of the distant future must not be person-regarding.
Norton’s Weak Anthropocentrism
The trust analogy presents us with two levels: But in his development of the weak anthropocentric position he does not indicate clearly just what can from such a position be judged to be of intrinsic value. Norton also holds that there are things of “fundamental value,” pre sumably things of intrinsic value.
The latter theory holds that a nonhuman entity can also be a locus of such fundamental value. The weakly anthropocentric view makes possible the kind of environmental ethics described earlier by Callicott, that is, an ethic that provides reasons to praise or censure certain human actions toward the environ ment.
Norton defines strong anthropocentrism as a value theory that is explained by reference to environmenfal of some felt preference of a human individual.