FIELD MANUAL No. HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Section V – AirLand Battle and Counterguerrilla Operations. Donor challenge: Your generous donation will be matched 2-to-1 right now. Your $5 becomes $15! Dear Internet Archive Supporter,. I ask only. Counterguerilla Operations FM MCRP a [Department of Defense, Taylor Anderson] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The
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If they stay in the operational area for a prolonged period with no external resupply, then their level of efficiency decreases until US forces possess an equal capability. Offensive and defensive techniques are discussed in Chapter 3. There are three requirements that must exist before an insurgency can occur. In addition, facilities and operations that may not seem likely targets may in fact be guerrilla targets solely because of their vulnerability.
In most cases, the one-third rule may be applied. However, reaction to intelligence may require an immediate response. Generally, guerrillas favor rough, inaccessible terrain with cover and concealment, affording them routes of escape and withdrawal if confronted or detected by counterguerrilla forces. Sign In Sign Out. Usually, guerrillas operating in a rear area then acquire logistical support from external sources, from captured equipment and supplies, and from the civilian populace.
FM Chptr 4 Counterguerrilla Operations In Conventional Conflicts
Their level of training is usually high, and these units are skilled in weapons, demolitions, communications, medicine, operations, and the ability to improvise when needed. The greater the amount of confusion created, the greater the ability of the main enemy force to discover and exploit weaknesses of the friendly force. Airborne, heliborne, or waterborne light infantry forces may also compose a guerrilla force if inserted to conduct guerrilla warfare operations disruption, harassment, or confusion.
The counterguerrilla force commander must be aware that the guerrilla force may have NBC weapons available to it. Unconventional warface forces that may conduct guerrilla warfare consist of special units trained specifically for guerrilla warfare and indigenous guerrilla forces sponsored by the main enemy force.
It must be anticipated that nuclear, chemical, and biological, as well as conventional weapons and tactics may be utilized to achieve guerrilla goals. He will effect liaison with all forces operating in his area of responsibility, fix specific responsibilities, and exercise overall control of defensive operations in response to a guerrilla threat.
FM COUNTER GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
Observation and fields of fire, Cover and concealment, Obstacles, Key terrain to include likely guerrilla targets and base campsand Avenues of approach or escape. This manual provides commanders and staffs of brigade elements and below with concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of counter- guerrilla operations by US forces in insurgency and conventional conflict environments.
For whatever the reasons — social, political, or economic — the population is generally open to change. Operatuons forces must, in all cases, treat the civilian populace in a fair and just manner whether the people support the US presence or not. These forces generally possess the weapons and equipment of the main countegguerrilla force.
The principles in this manual are guides to be adapted to each counterguerrilla situation. These actions may be conducted by conventional or unconventional forces utilizing guerrilla warfare tactics. The conditions of conventional conflicts differ greatly from an insurgency. A population that actively supports the counterguerrilla force greatly enhances the capability to detect guerrilla forces.
The distinctions between offensive and defensive techniques are sometimes difficult to discern. FM Download File – 1. The ability of the guerrilla force to operate successfully does not rely on the attainment of popular support. Usually, this type of population is found when US forces operate in friendly territory or liberate areas opposed to the goals of the enemy force.
In the event that the conflict takes place in enemy territory that is occupied, then the policies concerning interaction the the civilian populace will be formulated at theater level in consonance with guidance from the US government.
However, if it does exist, it normally occurs in support of enemy forces engaged in conventional combat with friendly forces and occurs in the friendly force rear areas. There must be a leadership element that can direct the frustrations of a dissatisfied populace along the lines delineated by the overall insurgent strategy.
The mere knowledge that the guerrilla exists within the rear area, even though undetected, may be enough. It must be recognized that, in some situations, the political system of the area will be sympathetic to the guerrillas. Rear battle FM is defined as those actions, including area damage control, taken by all units singly or in a combined effort to secure the force, neutralize or defeat enemy operations in the rear area, and ensure freedom of action in the deep and close-in battles.
U.S. Army Counterguerrilla Operations Manual
This manual provides commanders and staffs of brigade elements and below with concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of counterguerrilla operations by Cm forces in insurgency and conventional conflict environments. Usually, the indigenous guerrilla force must rely on external support for its logistics requirements. Generally, the counterguerrilla force plans its operations to minimize damage to the economic structure of operatilns area. When considering the environment that the participants will be involved in, the commander’s plans for counterguerrilla operations must consider terrain and climate, as well as political, sociological, economic, and psychological factors.
Usually, when US forces operate in friendly territory or liberate previously captured friendly territory, the sociological factors generally favor the counterguerrilla force.
Population support for the goals of the enemy force usually favors the guerrilla. Inhumane treatment and criminal acts murder, rape, or theft, even under stress of counterguegrilla and with provocation are serious and punishable violations under international law, the law of land warfare, and the US Uniform Code of Military Justice. The concept of resistance applies to an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist, oppose, or overthrow the existing government.
If the counterguerrilla force can detect the guerrilla force, then it is only a matter of time until the guerrillas are fixed and engaged.
Effective use of populace and resources control operations and psychological operations can reduce the logistical support received through the populace. An analysis of the factors of METT-T will provide the counterguerrklla information and indications to complete operational plans.
Because of the capability of NBC weapons to cause a maximum amount of ckunterguerrilla with a limited amount of personnel, their use must be considered as a method that the guerrilla may employ. The counterguerrilla force, on the other hand, is usually not dependent on the economy for its logistics.
The time available for planning must be wisely utilized.
FM 90-8 Counterguerilla Operations
If the guerrilla’s only source of resupply is external, then interdiction of counterguerilla supply lines can decrease or halt operations as the guerrilla’s supplies are exhausted. They are also used to minimize damage to a target if it is attacked. Counterguerrilla operations in support of a conventional conflict such as the partisan operations that occurred behind German lines during World War II are discussed in Chapter 4.
These may include specific limitations regarding the use of firepower and types of weapons, or they may be general regarding the relationship of the counterguerrilla force with the civilian population. Rolling, open terrain with less cover and concealment usually favors counterguerrilla forces in detecting and pursuing a guerrilla force. The greater the control the government has over the situation, the less likely are the chances for insurgent success The opposite is also true: The guerrilla force may possess weapons, communications, and technology equal to or superior to the rear battle forces.